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MOBILE HOME FINANCING
JAMES N. CASTLEBERRY*
INTRODUCTION

Skyrocketing sales of mobile homes during the past 10 years have,
naturally, been accompanied by comparable increases in legal problems
inherent in the financing of these sales. Input to these problems has
come from several sources, including adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, amendment of the Texas Certificate of Title Act, and unresolved questions relating to the status of mobile homes as consumer
goods, equipment, inventory, motor vehicles, and homesteads.
Initially, the topic, "Mobile Home Financing," demands definition
and clarification of such terms as "mobile home," "liens under the
Texas Certificate of Title Act," "fixtures," "homestead," and several
others.
HOME AS A "MOTOR VEHICLE" UNDER
THE TEXAS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ACT

MOBILE

There is no Texas statutory definition of mobile home. However,
the term "house trailer" is included in the definition of motor vehicle
as used in the Texas Certificate of Title Act.' A house trailer is defined
by the Act as "[A] vehicle without automotive power, designed for
human habitation and for carrying persons and property upon its own
structure and for being drawn by a motor vehicle."' The use of the
conjunctive mode indicates an intention to require that all of the enumerated conditions must be satisfied. Therefore, the term "mobile
Professor of Law, J.D., St. Mary's University.
1. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1436-1, § 2 (Supp. 1972), amending Tix. PENAL
CODE ANN. art. 1436-1, § 2 (1953).
*

2. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.art. 1436-1, § 2a (1953).
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home" is clearly included within the statutory description of a house
trailer, under the Texas Certificate of Title Act.
The statutory definition of a house trailer appears to impliedly exclude a structure which, though designed for human habitation, is not
designed for being drawn by a motor vehicle. Thus, a portable type
structure with no underlying frame and axle assembly would not meet
the requirement and would not be a house trailer under the Certificate
of Title Act. It might conceivably be argued that a portable structure
with no axles and wheels, but with runners or skids, would meet the
requirement that it be "designed for being drawn by a motor vehicle."
However, it is doubtful that such was the intention of the legislature.
Although there is no reported decision in Texas on the point, the requirement was probably intended to refer to a design with an underlying frame and axle assembly and wheels which would enable it to be
drawn by a motor vehicle on the public roads and highways. Additionally, it must be recognized that the statutory definition does not
require that the structure be used for human habitation, but only that
it be one which is designed for such use.3
Texas courts have recently considered the question whether certain
structures were classified as "trailers," "house trailers," or "trailer
homes." In Crawford v. Boyd,4 a wooden frame structure, 12 feet
wide and 64 feet long, was found not to be a "trailer house" within
the meaning of a building restriction prohibiting trailer homes, even
though the structure had exterior siding of aluminum and "looked a
lot like a mobile home."' This conclusion apparently was reached
because the structure was without axles and wheels, never intended
by the owner to be used as a vehicle, but rather as a permanent home
for his family, attached to the soil by cables and connected to a septic
tank. The court relied, in part, on a number of decisions from other
states to that effect. 6 In Aluminum Company of America v. Kohu-

tek, 7 the court held a structure, referred to as a "trailer house," that
had been deprived of all means of locomotion, placed on blocks, attached to public utilities, and used as a place of residence for eight
people, was a building within the meaning of a restrictive covenant, requiring submission of plans and specifications to be submitted by the
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
453 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 235.
Id. at 235.
455 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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grantee to the grantor regarding any building to be placed on the land
conveyed."
The term "lien," as used in the Certificate of Title Act, is defined
in very broad language:
The term "Lien" means a security interest, as defined in Section 1.201(37), Business and Commerce Code, created by every
kind of lease, conditional sales contract, deed of trust, chattel
mortgage, trust receipt, reservation of title, or other written security agreement, as defined in Section 9.105(a)(8), Business and
Commerce Code, of whatsoever kind or character whereby an
interest, other than an absolute title, is sought to be held or given
in a motor vehicle, and means any lien created or given by constitution or statute in a motor vehicle."
The proper classification of a mobile home as "inventory," "consumer goods," or "equipment," is extremely important because of the
difference in the requirements for the perfecting and filing of a lien on
a mobile home which is inventory, as distinguished from one which is
consumer goods or equipment. Section 41 of the Certificate of Title
Act, as amended in 1971, provides that a non-inventory lien on a motor vehicle which is the subject of either a first sale or a subsequent
sale can be perfected only by notation of the lien on the certificate
of title in accordance with the Texas Certificate of Title Act.'" The
term "inventory" is not defined by the Act, but since section 41 requires inventory liens to be perfected by compliance with chapter 9
of the Business and Commerce Code, the definition of "inventory," in
that portion of the Code, is clearly applicable:
Goods are
(4)

"inventory" if they are held by a person who holds them
for sale or lease or to be furnished under contracts of
service or if he has so furnished them, or if they are raw
materials, work in process or materials used or consumed
in a business. Inventory of a person is not to be classified as his equipment."

There are two other classes of goods defined by section 9.109 of
the Code which are pertinent:
8. Id. at 791.
9. TEX. PENAL CODE AN. art. 1436-1, § 3 (Supp. 1972), amending TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. art. 1436-1, § 3 (1953).
10. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1436-1, § 41 (Supp. 1972).
11. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9..109(4) (1968).
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Goods are
(1) "consumer goods" if they are used or bought for use
primarily for personal, family or household purposes;
(2) "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily
in business (including farming or a profession) or by a
debtor who is a non-profit organization or a governmental
subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included
of inventory, farm products or conin the definitions
2
sumer goods;1
As the Uniform Commercial Code Comment in section 9.109 points
out, the classification of goods as "consumer goods," "equipment," and
"inventory," are mutually exclusive.' 8 The property cannot at the
same time be both equipment and consumer goods, or both equipment
and inventory, or any other combination. Therefore, a mobile home
owned by a retail dealer might be either consumer goods, or equipment, or inventory. The principal use of the goods is determinative
of its classification.' 4 If used by him as a week-end and summer vacation vehicle for the family, it is a consumer good; if used in his business
as an office for himself and his employees, it is equipment; if he holds
it for purposes of sale or lease, it is inventory. Although the Code may
be looked to for these definitions, Section 41 of the Certificate of Title
Act is a special provision relating to the perfection and filing of liens
on motor vehicles and, therefore, prevails over the provisions of the
Business and Commerce Code in this respect. 15
PERFECTION OF NON-INVENTORY LIENS ON
MOBILE HOMES IN TEXAS

Prior to adoption of the U.C.C. in 1965, the Texas lender was
plagued by the prospect of application of the Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz'8
decision which gave indefinite protection to the holder of a foreign
lien, perfected and recorded under the law of that jurisdiction, as
against an innocent purchaser for value and without notice in Texas,
even though the purchaser relied on a Texas certificate of title which
failed to show any liens on the vehicle.' 7 In 1971, the Texas Supreme
Court held that section 9.103 of the Code abrogated the Fretz deci12. Id. at (1), (2).

13. id. at comment 2.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
TEx. Bus. & COMm. CODE ANN. § 9.310 (1968).
148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W.2d 843 (1950).
Id. at 560, 226 S.W.2d at 849.
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Currently, when a motor vehicle is covered by a Texas certifititle, Texas law will be applied in determining whether a lien
vehicle is perfected and enforceable against an innocent purand a lien on a motor vehicle cannot be enforced against an

innocent purchaser unless it is noted on the Texas certificate of title.1 9
It appears, then, that the non-inventory mobile home lender in Texas
is entitled to rely on a Texas certificate of title covering the vehicle,

and will be protected, assuming, of course, that the applicant for the
loan is the owner and his name appears as such on the certificate.
ACCESSIONS

The priorities recognized with respect to accessions to mobile homes
usually create no serious problems. The requirements of the Certificate of Title Act, with respect to the filing and recording of liens, do

not apply to liens created on tires, radios, heaters, or other automobile accessories.2" Thus, the general provisions of section 9.314 of the
Business and Commerce Code relating to accessions apply.2 ' As a

general proposition (eliminating the rarely occurring exceptions set out
in 9.314(c)22 ), if the security interest in the accessory attaches before
18. Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 465 S.W.2d 933
(Tex. Sup. 1971).
19. Id. at 937. The court cited Section 9.103(d) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code which states:
Notwithstanding Subsections (b) and (c), if personal property is covered by the
certificate of title issued under a statute of this state or any other jurisdiction which
requires indication on the certificate of title of any security interest in the property as a condition of perfection, then the perfection is governed by the law of the
jurisdiction which issued the certificate.
Additionally, Section 44 of the Texas Certificate of Title Act, was cited which refers
only to motor vehicles for which a receipt or certificate of title had been issued. In
1971, the legislature repealed section 44 of the Act, but included the essence of that
section in the substantially amended provisions of section 41. Prior to 1971, section 41
covered liens on motor vehicles which were the subject of a first sale, requiring the lien
to be noted on the importer's or manufacturer's certificate. This section now provides
that a non-inventory lien on a motor vehicle, which is the subject of either a first or a
subsequent sale, can be perfected only by notation of the lien on the certificate in accordance with the Act, and that an inventory lien can be perfected only by complying
with chapter 9 of the Business and Commerce Code. Thus, it is no longer possible to
perfect a lien on a motor vehicle which is the subject of a first sale by noting such on
the importer's or manufacturer's certificate. If such a vehicle is non-inventory, the
lien must be noted on the certificate of title; if it is inventory, it must be perfected in
accordance with the requirements of chapter 9 of the Business and Commerce Code.
20. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1436-1, § la (1953).
21. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.314 (1968).
22. These being:
(1) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the whole; or
(2) a creditor with a lien on the whole subsequently obtained by judicial proceedings; or
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the accessory is installed or affixed to the mobile home, the security
interest takes priority over a prior perfected security interest i the mobile home."
If the security interest attaches after the accessory becomes a part of the mobile home, it is not valid as against a person
who has a prior perfected security interest in the mobile home unless
that person has consented, in writing, to the security interest in the accession or has disclaimed an interest in the accession as a part of the

mobile home.24
FIXTURES

If the mobile home is considered as either consumer goods or equipment and the wheels are removed and it is attached to realty in such
manner and with the requisite intent to make it a permanent accession to the freehold, it may be deemed a "fixture."2 5 This type of
situation is illustrated in those instances readily observable at any lake
resort area where the owner has purchased a mobile home, moved it to
his tract, removed the wheels and attached it to an existing house, or
placed it on concrete blocks, in such manner that it cannot be easily
detached and removed without destroying it and without causing substantial damage to the realty.
The common law definitions of the term "fixture" are many and
fraught with confusion, with the Texas Business and Commerce Code
doing nothing to alleviate the situation. 2
The leading case in Texas
defining a "fixture" is Hutchins v. Masterson & Strelet27 where it was
announced:
[W]hether a chattel has become an immovable fixture, consists
in the united application of the following tests:
1st. Has there been a real or constructive annexation of the
article in question to the realty?
(3) a creditor with a prior perfected security interest in the whole to the extent that he makes subsequent advances if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien

by judicial proceedings obtained or the subsequent advance under the prior perfected security interest is made or contracted for without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. A purchaser of the whole at a foreclosure sale other than the holder of a perfected security interest purchasing at his

own foreclosure sale is a subsequent purchaser within this section.
23. Tax. Bus. & COMm. CODE ANN. § 9.314(a) (1968).
24. Id. at (b).

25. See Hutchins v.Masterson & Street, 46 Tex. 551 (1877).
26. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.313 (1968)

provides that "[t]he law of

this state other than this title determines whether and when other goods become fix.
tures."
27. 46 Tex. 551 (1887).
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2nd. Was there a fitness or adaptation of such article to the
uses or purposes of the realty with which it is connected?
3rd. Whether or not it was the intention of the party making
the annexation that the chattel should become a permanent accession to the freehold?-this intention being inferable from the
nature of the article, the relation and situation of the parties interested, the policy of the law in respect thereto, the mode of annexation, and purpose or use for which the annexation is made.
And of these three tests, pre-eminence is to be given to the
question of intention to make the article a permanent accession to
the freehold, while the others are chiefly of value as evidence as
to this intention.2"
Assuming that a mobile home would, because of appropriate facts
and circumstances, be deemed a "fixture," what must be done in order
to preserve and protect the security interest of a secured party in that
unit? According to section 9.313 of the Business and Commerce
Code, if the security interest has attached to the mobile home before
it is affixed to the realty, i.e., before it becomes a fixture, the security
interest takes priority over the claims of all persons then having an interest in the realty.29 A security interest attaches, under section
9.204,30 when all three of the following requisites are met, unless an
explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching: (1) there is agreement (subdivision (3) of section 1.201) that it attach, (2) value is
given, and (3) the debtor has rights in the collateral.8 1 Thus, if these
three requirements are satisfied before the mobile home is affixed to
realty, the security interest takes priority over any other then existing
claims.
The Code does not require that this security interest be perfected by
filing a financing statement in order to gain priority over existing
claims.3 2 However, it is necessary to perfect it by filing a financing
statement in order to be protected against a subsequent purchaser for
value, a subsequent creditor with a judicially obtained lien on the
realty, or a creditor with a prior recorded encumbrance on the realty
8
to the extent of subsequent advances.
Only in very rare cases should the lender consider taking a security
interest in a mobile home after it has become attached to realty as a
28. Id. at 554.
29. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.313(b) (1968).
30. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.204 (1968).

31. Id. at (2).
32.

TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.

33. Id. at comment 3.

§

9.313, comment 3 (1968).
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In such a situation, the security interest is invalid and unen-

forceable against any person with an interest in the realty at the time
the security interest attached, unless that person has consented, in 'writing, to the security interest or has disclaimed, in writing, an interest
in the mobile home as a fixture.3 4 In addition, it should be noted that

in this situation, since the mobile home has become a fixture before
the security interest attached, it is necessary to perfect the security

interest by filing a financing statement in order to have priority, as
against the type of subsequent purchasers and creditors mentioned in

the preceding paragraph.
Financing statements covering goods which are or will become fix-

tures must conform to the general requirements of the Code as to form
and content, and additionally must contain a description of the realty

concerned and the name of the record owner of such realty. 5 If the
financing statement relates to a purchase money security interest in a
fixture, with a purchase price not exceeding $1,500, the name of the
record owner, as supplied by the debtor, is sufficient unless the secured
party knows that such is not the correct name."6 Financing statements covering fixtures are required to contain the statement: "Col' '37
lateral is or includes fixtures.

The "Uniform" version of the Code leaves uncertain whether the
recording is to be made and indexed in the same records as other types

of security interests in realty, or whether it is to be recorded and indexed separately.38

In 1967, section 9.403(d) of the Texas version

of the Code was amended by adding the following provision:
34. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.313(c) (1968).
35. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.110 (1968). This section provides that
"[f]or the purposes of this chapter any description of personal property or real estate is
.sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described."
36. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.401(c) (1968) provides:
A filing which is made in the proper county continues effective for four months
after a change to another county of the debtor's residence or place of business or
the location of the collateral, whichever controlled the original filing. It becomes
ineffective thereafter unless a copy of the financing statement signed by the secured party is filed in the new county within said period. The security interest
may also be perfected in the new county after the expiration of the four-month
period; in such case perfection dates from the time of perfection in the new county.
A change in the use of the collateral does not impair the effectiveness of the
original filing.
37. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.403(d) (1968).
38. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.401 (1968) provides instruction as to the
proper place where the financing statement should be filed in order to perfect a security
interest:
When the collateral is goods which at the time the security interest attaches are or
are to become fixtures, then in the office of the County Clerk in the county
where the real estate concerned is located.
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Where the financing statement bears the statement "Collateral is
or includes fixtures" or its substantial equivalent, the filing officer
shall index the financing statement in a separate book endorsed
"Security Interests in Fixtures." The filing of a financing statement bearing the above described statement perfects a security
interest only in goods which are or are to become fixtures.
The filing is required to be indexed only in the name of the debtor.3 9
Since the debtor as to the fixture may not be the record owner of the
realty to which the fixture is attached, there is no way that a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without actual notice, proposing to
purchase the realty, can ascertain from the record the rights of one
claiming a prior perfected security interest in the fixture. This poses
the same basic type of unsatisfactory circumstance, for the very same
reason, that was experienced prior to the adoption of the Code under
old article 549840 which led to the decision in Lone Star Gas Co. v.
Sheaner.4 ' In Sheaner, a lien on a water heater which a tenant had
placed in a rented house was held valid and enforceable as against a
subsequent bona fide purchaser for value who purchased the realty
without knowledge of the existence of such lien.4" There has been
much criticism as to this result, especially from the title insurance
companies. A memorandum dated June 27, 1967, from John L. Hill,
Secretary of State, to the County Clerks of Texas, urged that financing
statements covering fixtures be indexed under the name of the record
owner of the realty as well as the name of the debtor in those instances
where they are not the same person, even though such procedure is
not provided for in the Code.
In the event of default, a party holding a security interest in fixtures
and entitled to priority may sever and remove the fixture from the
realty. 43 He must, however, reimburse any owner or encumbrancer of
the realty, who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed,
for the cost of repair of any physical injury which results therefrom."
Persons entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove
the fixture until the secured party gives adequate security for the performance of this duty.4 5 Thus, as to security interests in fixtures, the
39. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.403(d) (1968).
40. Tex. Laws 1917, ch. 153, § I at 361, as amended TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE
ANN. § 10.102 (1968).
41. 157 Tex. 508, 305 S.W.2d 150 (1957).
42. Id. at 515, 305 S.W.2d at 155.
43. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.313(e) (1968).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Code has put an end to the old common law test of material injury to
the freehold regarding the right of removal which was nebulous and
uncertain at best.4 It assures a right of removal of the fixture, yet affords adequate protection to the owner of the realty.
MECHANIC'S AND MATERIALMAN'S LIEN

One vexatious situation which lenders encounter is that of the priority which is given to the mechanic's or materialman's lien by the
Business and Commerce Code for services and materials furnished with
respect to a mobile home even though subsequent in time to a prior
perfected security interest in the mobile home. Section 9.310 of the
Code provides:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such person given
by statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory
and the statute expressly provides otherwise.
A close reading of this provision raises four interesting points. First:
not everyone who furnishes services or materials is entitled to this priority. The furnishing of such services or materials must have been by
one "in the ordinary course of his business. '4 7 This will preclude the
nuisance claimant who, at the instigation of the debtor (or his wife's
uncle or the mobile home park landlord), alleges a priority of lien
when repossession is about to be effected by the holder of the prior recorded purchase money lien. Second: for many years Section 43 of
the Certificate of Title Act 8 contained the express provision required
by section 9.310 of the Code, giving priority to liens on motor vehicles
according to the date of recording on the receipt or certificate of title.49
However, section 43 of the Act was repealed in 197111 and there is
no longer a statute which expressly provides for a priority of lien on
motor vehicles contrary to that fixed by section 9.310 of the Code.
Third: the exception as to priority extends only to a lien which is
statutory and the statute expressly provides for some other priority.5"
The Texas Constitution provides:
46. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.313, comment 5 (1968).
47. Tnx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.3 10, comment 2 (1968).
48. Tex. Laws 1939, ch. 4, § 43 at 602.

49. GMC Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Irving Bank & Trust Co., 463 S.W.2d 274, 276
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ).
50. Tex. Laws 1971, ch. 123, § 7 at 896.
51. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.310 (1968).
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Mechanics, artisans and material men, of every class, shall have
a lien upon the buildings and articles made or repaired by them
for the value of their labor done thereon, or material furnished
therefor; and the Legislature shall provide by law for the speedy
and efficient enforcement of said liens.5 2
It is a well established rule that this lien is self-executing, and exists
independently of any legislative act.5 3 The legislature can only provide
for the speedy and efficient enforcement of the lien. 4 Since the lien
is constitutional, and not statutory in origin, it appears that the lien
should be entitled to the priority given by section 9.310 of the Code,
irrespective of any subsequent legislative exception. Fourth: the priority extends only to "a lien upon goods in the possession of such person . .. ."' The lien priority is, therefore, restricted to a "possessory" type of lien. Thus, when possession of the collateral is lost, the
priority vanishes.56
It appears that following the repeal of Section 43 of the Certificate
of Title Act, a possessory lien arising from the furnishing of services
or materials to a motor vehicle in the ordinary course of one's business will have priority over a prior perfected lien on the vehicle, irrespective of notice, good faith, perfection, or recording. Perhaps this
priority may not be as bad as it seems at first glance. It represents
a policy approach with long standing precedent with respect to vehicles which are susceptible to employment in commerce. 7 The same
approach has long been used in admiralty law regarding repairs to
ships, the rationale being that it is to the mutual interest and benefit
of both the mortgagee and the owner-mortgagor that the ship be
promptly repaired, enabling the expeditious return of the ship to work
58
so that the mortgage obligations can be promptly met.
HOMESTEAD RIGHTS IN A MOBILE HOME

A prospective lender must consider the question of homestead status
in those instances where he is considering the making of a loan for a
purpose other than purchase money, taxes due on the mobile home,
or for improvements to it, because liens to secure loans for any pur52. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 37.
53. Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 528, 35 S.W. 1054, 1056 (1896).
54. Id. at 527, 35 S.W. at 1055.
55. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.310 (1968).
56. Id. at comment 2.
57. Annot., 32 A.L.R. 1005 (1924).
58. 48 AM. JuR. Shipping § 564 (1943).
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pose other than these are not enforceable as against a homestead.59
The question continues to be raised whether. a homestead right can
exist in a mobile home. The constitutional definition of the rural homestead is property consisting of not more than 200 acres of land
in one or more parcels, together with the improvements thereon. 0
The urban homestead consists of a lot or lots, not to exceed $10,000
in value at the time of designation as the homestead, without reference to the value of any improvements thereon. Furthermore, the
property must be used for the purposes of a home or as a place to exercise the calling or business of the head of a family."'
In the leading Texas case, Cullers & Henry v. James,"2 the supreme
court pointed out that the homestead exemption is for lots or acres of
land. 63 The language of the opinion makes it clear that the homestead exemption is an exemption of realty as distinguished from an
exemption of personalty." Accordingly, the court held that property,
to be exempt as part of the homestead, "must be part of the exempt
realty." 65
Three Texas courts of civil appeals cases have passed on the question of whether a mobile home can have homestead status. In Clark
v. Vitz,66 the owner placed a house trailer on blocks alongside his brick
house and connected it to the electrical wiring of the house. The
court held that it had been made a part of the house and consequently
was part of the homestead, hence exempt from attachment by a general
creditor. 67 In Gann v. Montgomery,68 the mobile home owner secured
the permission of his parents to park his house trailer, still mounted
on wheels, in his parents' backyard behind the rented house in which
the parents lived, while he looked for a job. Three weeks later, he
59. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. This section provides that the homestead of a
family is not subject to forced sale for any debts except for the purchase money or
any part thereof, taxes due thereon, or for work and material used in constructing improvements thereon.
60. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
61. Id.
62. 66 Tex. 494, 1 S.W.314 (1886).
63. Id. at 498, 1 S.W. at 315. Subsequently, the supreme court inWoods v.Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 591, 19 S.W.2d 35, 37 (1929) mentioned the distinction between the homestead and personal property exemptions in its historical analysis of the homestead laws.
64. Cullers & Henry v. James, 66 Tex. 494, 1 S.W. 314 (1886).
65. Id. at 499, 1 S.W. at 315.
66. 190 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1945, writ ref'd).
67. Id. at 738.
68. 210 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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executed a note for $1,200 and mortgaged the house trailer to secure
the payment of the note. The court distinguished this case from Vitz,
pointing out that the owner of the mobile home held no possessory
interest in the realty on which the mobile home was situated and that
the mobile home had not been attached to realty so as to become a
part of it. 69 Consequently, it was held that the mobile home was not
a part of exempt homestead realty and could not receive protection
from foreclosure of the mortgage.70 In the most recent decision, Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. Walker, 71 a judgment creditor sought to foreclose on a mobile home which was occupied by the debtor's family.
The mobile home was situated on concrete blocks, the wheels removed,
on a trailer park lot which the debtor rented on a month-to-month
basis. The court held that a leasehold interest in land, such as the
debtor's periodic tenancy, was a sufficient interest in realty to support
a homestead exemption, with such exemption extending to the improvements so attached to the realty as to become a part of it.72
Consequently, if the mobile home is so modified as to deprive it
of its mobility, is so attached to realty as to become a fixture, and
is used for the purpose of a home or as a place to exercise the calling
or business of the head of a family, it may be treated for all purposes
as a part of the homestead. If so, any lien thereon must conform to
the requirements of a lien on the homestead. For example, a lien to
secure a post-purchase loan would require the joinder of the husband
and wife, regardless of whether the mobile home belonged to the separate estate of one of them or to the community estate of both." The
lien would, of course, have to be recorded in the county where the
homestead, or some part of it, is situated in order to gain protection
under the recording statutes against subsequent creditors and purchas74
ers of the homestead realty.
The lender is frequently faced with the "filing dilemma." Where
should he file his lien if the mobile home is deemed to be either "consumer goods" or a "fixture" or a part of the homestead, or perhaps
a combination of these? Most lenders today are wisely following the
advice which has been widely circulated through Uniform Commercial
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 260.
Id. at 260.
448 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 835.
TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE Ar. § 9.313, comment 3, and § 9.401(a) (1968).
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Code Institutes: when in doubt, "file, file, file," in such manner as to
cover every reasonable contingency.
ASSIGNMENT OF SECURITY INTEREST

IN A MOBILE HOME

Under the Business and Commerce Code, the obligation to pay, as
well as the security interest in the collateral which secures that obligation, may be created by a security agreement. 7 As a result, many
lenders no longer use the promissory note in transactions under the
Code. As provided by the Code:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different
rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by
a buyer or lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any
claim or defense which he may have against the seller or lessor
is enforceable by an assignee who takes his !assignment for value,
in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except as
to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in
due course of a negotiable instrument under the chapter on Commercial Paper (Chapter 3). A buyer who as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such an agreement. 76
The Texas Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act, which covers mobile
homes, contains a provision to the contrary:
No retail installment contract.

. .

shall:

(6)

Provide that the buyer agrees not to assert against the seller
or holder of any claim or defense arising out of the sale.71
However, the succeeding section of the Act provides that if a retail installnent sales contract is negotiated to a third party, who acquires
it in good faith and for value and gives the notice provided for in the
Act, and the third party does not receive, within 30 days of the mailing
of such notice, a written notice from the buyer of any fact giving rise
to any claim or defense of the buyer, any right of action or defense
78
of a buyer may be cut off.
In reading these two sections of the Texas Motor Vehicle Installment
Sales Act together, and seeking to give effect to both, it appears that
while section 7.07 prohibits a provision in the contract under which
75.
76.
77.
78.

TEx.
Tax.
TEx.
TEx.

Bus.
Bus.
REV.
REV.

& COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(a) (8) (1968).
& COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.206(a) (1968).
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07 (1971) (emphasis added).
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.08(4) (1971).
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the buyer agrees that he will not assert any claim or defense against
a holder of the contract, any such claim or defense may be cutoff
under section 7.08 as against a holder who has satisfied the notice
7
requirements thereof. 1
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF A SECURED PARTY

UPON DEFAULT

The rights and remedies of a secured party and the debtor, upon
default, are governed by subchapter E of section 9 of the Business
and Commerce Code."' The term "default" is not defined by the
Code, and the security agreement should clearly set out what will constitute default. The security agreement should also contain an acceleration clause giving the holder of the agreement an option, upon default, to mature the agreement and to declare the entire unpaid balance
of the obligation to be immediately due and payable. The general
provisions of the Code which require good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care apply."'
A secured party has several alternatives upon default, including the
right to take possession of the mobile home upon default unless there
is an agreement to the contrary. The Code authorizes the secured
party to take possession without judicial process (if it can be done
without a breach of the peace) or to render equipment unusable and
to dispose of the collateral without removal from the debtor's premises. s2 A secured party asserting the right to possession of a chattel
may, after filing a suit to enforce such right, apply to the court for the
issuance of a writ of sequestration when the circumstances indicate
that the chattel should be seized by the court, and held in its custody
pending judgment.8 3 This is done to prevent the chattel from being
79. The notice requirements of article 5069-7.08 provide:
A notice of negotiation shall be in writing addressed to the buyer at the address

shown on the contract and shall identify the contract, state the names of the
seller and buyer; describe the motor vehicle; state the time balance and the number and amounts of the installments. The notice of negotiation shall contain the following warning to the buyer in ten-point bold face type:
IF YOU HAVE ANY COMPLAINT OR OBJECTION REGARDING THE
GOODS OR SERVICES COVERED BY THE CONTRACT IDENTIFIED

IN THIS NOTICE, OR ANY CLAIM OR DEFENSE RELATING TO
SUCH CONTRACT, YOU MUST NOTIFY US WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM
THE DATE THIS NOTICE WAS MAILED.
80. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.501-.507 (1968).
81. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.102(c) (1968).
82. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (1968). Note should be taken that

the authority to render the collateral unusable does not extend to consumer goods;
only to equipment.
83. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (1960); Tax. R. Crv. P. 696-716.
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damaged or removed from the court's jurisdiction. This right, however, must be considered in the light of the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 4 which held that procedural due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before the
state authorizes its agents to seize property in the possession of a person upon the application of another.8 5 The Court therefore acknowledged that a state has the power to seize goods before a final judgment
in order to protect the security interests of creditors "so long as those
creditors have tested their claim to the goods through the process of a
fair prior hearing. '8 6 The Court held that while the nature and form
of such prior hearings were deemed to be matters for legislation rather
than adjudication, the state must provide for "the kinds of 'notice' and
'hearing' which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the
probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor
before he can be deprived of his property .

,,. The Court refused

to sustain the contention that the contractual provisions, which authorized the secured party to repossess the merchandise, constituted a
waiver of the debtor's basic procedural due process rights. 8 In doing
so, the Court distinguished the facts in Fuentes from those in D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co."9 where the Court had outlined the considerations relevant to a contractual waiver of due process rights.20 In Overmyer, the contract was negotiated between two corporations and the
waiver provisions were specifically bargained for and drafted by their
lawyers in the process of the negotiations so that the waiver was voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made by both parties who were
aware of the significance of the waiver provision. In Fuentes, the contracting parties "were far from equal in bargaining power" and the
purported waiver provision had not been the subject of any bargaining
or negotiation, but was part of the printed sales contract and as such
had the markings of a contract of adhesion. 01
Accordingly, any attempt to strip the usual type of unsophisticated
84. 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972).
85. Id. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 2002, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 579.
86. Id. at

-,

92 S. Ct. at 2002, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 579.

87. Id. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 2002-03, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 579, quoting Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (concurring opinion).
88. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, -, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 2001-02, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556,
578 (1972).
89. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
90. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, -, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 2001, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, 578
(1972).
91. Id. at -, 92 $. Ct, at 2002, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 578,
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debtor of his due process rights prior to default, by provisions in a
printed form security agreement is not likely to survive an attack. The
Court, in Fuentes, indicated that a debtor may waive his right to such
a hearing after he has received notice of his opportunity for one and,
"sensing the futility of the exercise in the particular case" has decided
not to take advantage of it.9 2 The notice in each case must be such
as will insure that the particular debtor's waiver of his basic procedural due process rights was voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly
made, and that he was aware of the significance of his waiver.
If the secured party takes possession of the mobile home, he must
use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of it, for failure
to do so renders him liable for any loss occasioned thereby.9 3 Reasonable expenses incurred in the custody, preservation, use or operation of the collateral, including insurance, taxes and other charges, are
chargeable to the debtor and are secured by the collateral. 94 The mobile home may be used or occupied by a secured party pursuant to a
court order or for the purpose of preserving it or its value. 95 It may
also be used or occupied in a manner and to the extent provided in
the security agreement if the mobile home is classified as "equipment,"
but not if it is deemed "consumer goods." 98
The secured party in possession of a mobile home, as collateral,
after default may propose to keep it in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation if: (1) the mobile home is deemed "equipment;" or (2) the
mobile home is considered "consumer goods" and he holds a purchase
money security interest in the mobile home wherein the debtor has
paid less than 60 percent of the cash price; or (3) the mobile home
is considered as "consumer goods," and he holds a non-purchase
money security interest in the mobile home wherein the debtor has
paid less than 60 percent of the loan; or (4) the debtor has signed,
after default, a statement modifying or renouncing his rights under
subchapter E of the Business and Commerce Code. 97 A proposal to
keep the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation must be sent, in
writing, to the debtor and except in the case of consumer goods, to
any other secured party who has a security interest in the mobile home
and who has filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the
92. Id. at - n.29, 92 S. Ct. at 2000, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 577.
93. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.207(a), (c) (1968).

94. Id. at (b).
95. Id. at (d).
96. Id.
97. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.505(a) (1968).
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debtor. This proposal must also be sent to any party known by the
secured party to have a security interest in the mobile home. The secured party is entitled to retain the mobile home in satisfaction of the
debtor's obligation unless the debtor or any other person entitled to
notice objects in writing within 30 days either from receipt of notice, or
after the secured party took possession." If such objection is made,
the secured party must dispose of the mobile home under section 9.504
of the Business and Commerce Code.99
The debtor or any other secured party has the right to redeem the
collateral, unless otherwise agreed to in writing after default, at any
time before the collateral has been disposed of, its disposition has been
contracted for by the secured party, or before the secured party has
accepted it in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation.' ° Redemption
requires tender of the fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral, together with all expenses reasonably incurred by the secured
party in retaking, holding, preparing the collateral for sale, arranging
for the sale, and to the extent provided for in the security agreement
and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal
expenses incurred.' 0 '
The secured party in possession of a mobile home as collateral must
dispose of it under section 9.504 within 90 days after taking possession, provided: (1) the mobile home is considered as "consumer
goods" subject to a purchase money security interest, wherein the
debtor has paid 60 percent of the cash price; or (2) the mobile home
is considered as "consumer goods" subject to a non-purchase money
security interest, wherein the debtor has paid 60 percent of the loan;
or (3) written objections have been timely made, under subsection
(b) of section 9.505, to a proposal by the secured party to keep the
mobile home in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation; or (4) the debtor
has not signed, after default, a statement renouncing or modifying his
rights under section 9.505."0'

In the event the secured party fails to

dispose of the mobile home pursuant to and in accordance with these
requirements, the debtor, at his option, may recover from the secured
party either in conversion or under section 9.507 (a). °
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at (b).
Id.
TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.506 (1968).

Id.

102. TEx. Bus. &COMM.

CODE ANN.

§ 9.505(a) (1968).

103. Id.; accord, Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Co., 415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1966); cf. Barker v. Horn, 432 S.W.2d 21 (Ark. 1968).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss2/1

18

Castleberry: Mobile Home Financing.

1973]

MOBILE HOME FINANCING

After default, a secured party is entitled to dispose of the mobile

home by sale, lease, or otherwise, either in its existing condition or after
any preparation or processing that is commercially reasonable." 4 The
Business and Commerce Code requires that the proceeds of disposition

be applied in the following order:
(1) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for
sale, selling and the like and, to the extent provided for in the
agreement and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys'
fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party;
(2) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured ....
(3) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate

security interest in the collateral [mobile home] if written notification of demand therefor is received before distribution of the
proceeds is completed. If requested by the secured party, the
holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably furnish

reasonable proof of his interest ....10,
The secured party must account to the debtor for any remaining surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency.106,
The mobile home may be disposed of either publicly or privately
at any time and place, upon any terms. Provided, however, that every
aspect thereof must be commercially reasonable.117 In determining
the time and place of the sale and whether it is to be public or private,

"[tihe pragmatic considerations under 'commercial reasonableness'
must relate to 'every aspect of the disposition' . . . ."10 including such
aspects as the rate of depreciation of the property, storage fees, insur-

ance fees, and maintenance expenses.' 0
104. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(a) (1968).
105. Id.
106. Id. at (b).
107. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698, 712 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 398 E.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968). Section 9.504(c) of the Business and
Commerce Code provides in part that:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings . . .but every
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must
be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline
speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be
made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, and except in the case of
consumer goods to any other person who has a security interest in the collateral
and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the debtor in
this state or who is known by the secured party to have a security interest in the
collateral.
108. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698, 715 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968).
109. Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F. Supp. 659, 662 (W.D.
Okla. 1972).
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If the mobile home is considered as "consumer goods," the secured
party is required to send reasonable notice to the debtor of the time
and place of any public sale, or the time after which a private sale or
other disposition, will be made."' Reasonable notice is not specifically
defined by the Code, but "at a minimum it must be sent in such time
that persons entitled to receive it will have sufficient time to take appropriate steps to protect their interests by taking part in the sale or
other disposition if they so desire.""'
The question of what constitutes a commercially reasonable sale is
raised in several sections of the Code." 2 A Tennessee court used the
following language in discussing commercially reasonable standards:
[T]he disposition shall be made in keeping with prevailing trade
practices among reputable and responsible business and commercial enterprises engaged in the same or similar business."'"
Included in consideration of what is commercially reasonable is the
"method, manner, time, place and terms" of the sale.'" 4 In general,
while the method of sale may be either public or private,"1 5 the secured party should choose between a public or private sale depending
upon which, if either, is more commercially reasonable.' 6 With reference to a private sale, the draftsmen of the Code state:
One recognized method of disposing of repossessed collateral is
for the secured party to sell the collateral to or through a dealera method which in the long run may realize better average returns
since the secured party does not usually maintain his own facilities
110. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (1968).
I 11. Id. at comment 5. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that a letter of notice
mailed more than one week before the resale gave the debtor reasonable notice even
though the debtor never came to know of the sale. Hudspeth Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson,
382 S.W.2d 191 (Ark. 1964). However, in Barker v. Horn, 432 S.W.2d 21 (Ark. 1968)
oral notice given by the secured party to the debtor at the time of repossession that the
automobile was to be sold to the highest bidder, without specifying any time or place
of sale, was held to be an unreasonable notice. A New Jersey court, in Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 276 A.2d 402 (N.J. Dist. CL 1971) held that 2 days notice was
insufficient while a Georgia court, in Motor Contract Co. v. Sawyer, 180 S.E.2d 282
(Ga. Ct. App. 1971) considered 10 days to be sufficient. The court in Sawyer went
on to say that "[plarties may agree between themselves upon standards (not manifestly
unreasonable) by which the fulfillment of the rights and duties provided by the UCC in
the event of default are to be measured [the agreement in that case stipulating 5 days]."
112. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.502(b), 9.504(c), 9.507(b) (1968).
113. Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1966).
114. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698, 712 (E.D. Pa.),
afj'd, 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968).
115. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (1968).
116. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 698, 712 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968).
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for making such sales. Such a method of sale, fairly conducted,
is recognized as commercially reasonable. ....117
If a private sale is held, steps should be taken to insure that it is conducted fairly in every respect.' 18 For example, it has been pointed out
that when the debt is one arising from a retail transaction, the debtor
should not be deprived of the benefit of the retail market." 19
As to the terms of the sale, "[T]he policy of the law . . . requires

a repossessing seller to resell at the best obtainable price on commercially reasonable terms."' 20 An unusually low price on resale,' 2 ' or a
sale of a used car at a price substantially less than the National Automobile Dealers' Association quotation is evidence that the sale did not
take place in a commercially reasonable manner.' 22 The fact that a
better price might have been obtainable, however, does not make the
sale unreasonable per se:
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at
a different time or in a different method from that selected by the
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was
not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured
party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price current in such
market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in
the type 12of property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable
manner.
In a private sale the "blue book" value of the mobile home does not
establish a recognized market value of the unit, 2 4 but the "blue book"
price may be used as evidence of the reasonable value of the unit and
if sold for significantly less, the sale may be held to be commercially
125
unreasonable.
In the event the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with
117. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.507, comment 2 (1968).
118. Eichman v. Highland Park State Bank, 345 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1961, writ ref'd).
119. Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 2 UCC L.J. 244, 255 (1970).
120. Elster's Sales v. El Bodrero Hotel, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 492, 493 (Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
121. Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797,,801 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
122. Atlas Constr. Co. v. Dravo-Doyle Co., 114 P.L.J. 34 (Allegheny County Ct.,
Pa. 1965); Family Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 24 Pa. D. & C2d 587 (Allegheny County Ct.
1965).
123. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.§ 9.507(b) (1968) (emphasis added).
124. Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales, Inc., 451 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Ark. 1970).
125. Atlas Constr. Co. v. Dravo-Doyle Co., 114 P.L.J. 34 (Allegheny County Ct.,
Pa. 1965).
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the Code requirements for the disposition of the collateral, a particular
disposition may be ordered or restrained as may be required.' 26 If a
wrongful disposition has occurred, the debtor, those entitled to notice,
and those whose security interest was made known to the secured party
prior to such disposition, are entitled to recover from the secured party
any loss caused thereby. 2 7 If the collateral was consumer goods, the
debtor is entitled to recover an amount not more than the credit service
charge plus 10 percent of the principal amount of the debt, or the
18
time differential price plus 10 percent of the cash price.
A purchaser for value of the mobile home, disposed of after default,
takes it free of any rights of the debtor, the security interest under
which the disposition was made, and all subordinate interests. 29 The
purchaser of the mobile home at such disposition is entitled to full
protection even though the secured party has failed to comply with
the Code requirements for the conduct of the disposition. 3 ' However, to be afforded this protection the purchaser at a public sale must
have purchased with no knowledge of any defects in the sale, and not
be guilty of collusion with the secured party, other bidders, or the person conducting the sale.'
If he purchased at a private sale, he must
have done so in good faith."3 2 While the purchaser at a private sale
is required to proceed in good faith, the purchaser at a public sale is
protected so long as he is not actively proceeding in bad faith, however, he is under no duty to inquire into the circumstances of the
sale. 1

3

If the disposition of the mobile home is through a public sale, the secured party is authorized to purchase it.' 3 4 However, since a mobile
home is not a type of collateral which is customarily sold in a recognized market or a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations, he is not authorized to purchase it at a private
35
sale.'
CONCLUSION

In the continuing absence of a statutory standard for positive deter-

mination of the status of a structure as a "mobile home" vel non, lend126. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.507(a) (1968).
127. Id.
128. Id.

129. TEx. Bus. & COMM.
130. Id.
131. Id.

CODE ANN.

§ 9.504(d) (1968).

CODE ANN.

§ 9.504, comment 4 (1968).

132. Id.

133. Tax. Bus. &COMM.
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ers engaged in mobile home financing will continue to be faced with
the problem of determining such status. Consideration must also be
given to determination of the classification of the collateral as "inventory," "equipment," or "consumer goods," and whether it is to remain

a chattel, or is to be affixed to realty. After default, the lender must
use diligence in meeting the statutory requirements for disposition of
the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.
134. Id. at (c).
135. Id. Although there are no Texas decisions on this point, decisions in other jurisdictions support this view. Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales, Inc., 451 S.W.2d 199, 202
(Ark. 1970); Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 398 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Ark.
1966); Nelson v. Monarch Inv. Plan, Inc., 452 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970);
Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 171 A.2d 548, 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961).
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